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Abstract
For more than a decade, Indonesia has been practicing decentralization. During this 
period, local governments still experience difficulties in generating local revenues 
to fund their development. Local government bonds (LGBs) are actually one of 
the finest sources for financing local development. However, until now there is no 
real practice in issuing local bonds in Indonesia though it is allowed in the existing 
regulation. There are still many considerations which hindered the realisation of LGB 
issuance ranging from the rule of mechanism to the local governments’ readiness 
themselves. To gain more insights about the issue, learning from another country (in 
this case: Japan) on how they manage LGBs effectively and securely will be beneficial. 
Comparison model between the two countries is chosen to see the regulation 
and managerial aspects in LGB implementation including the main institution in 
central level, rules of the game, buyers and purposes. By having this comparison, 
it is expected that some crucial factors can be looked at, which may then provide 
us some information on why LGBs are yet to bloom in Indonesia. Moreover, the 
comparison is expected to provide some basis about the possibility to ease policy 
adoption for Indonesia in managing LGBs. 
 
Key words: local government bond (LGBs), institutions, buyers, rule of games and 
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I. Introduction
 
1.1 Background
Indonesia undertook a major change on its local governance system in 1999, 
shortly after President Soeharto (who held the presidency since 1968) stepped 
down in 1998.  The central and local government relationship was then shifted 
from authoritarian centralistic into democratic de-centralistic (Lewis, 2010). Under 
decentralisation era, significant authorities as well as funding have been delegated to 
local level. However, this change has not yet inspired improvement in service delivery 
and infrastructure conditions in many districts. In practice, there are still many barriers 
in delivering local government’s functions optimally. The first barrier would be the 
high dependency on central government funding. Turner (2006) argues that Local 
governments are being more dependent on central transfer since decentralisation. 
Unfortunately, the dominant proportion of these local government budgets (APBD) 
is allocated for expenditure on salaries rather than capital expenditures. Secondly, 
the economic activities are not evenly distributed across space; most of them are 
still concentrated on Java (57.99%) and Sumatera (23.81%) (BPS,2014). This condition 
brings about difficulties for outer islands (outside Java) to increase their economic 
performance. Thirdly, there are still disparities in infrastructures development, 
especially between western and eastern parts of Indonesia (Bappenas, 2015). Poor 
infrastructure in eastern Indonesia certainly influences the local economy, which 
in turn also influence its contribution to the national economy. More funding for 
infrastructure development in the region is greatly needed. 
Having these backgrounds, local governments still have a long way to be 
fully independent economically. When local governments with high transfer 
dependence encounter unexpected financial problems, it may lead to limitation 
of raising additional revenues. Thus, their options to cope with the problems will be 
limited to either cutting services, running deficits, or relying on arrears to employees 
and contractors (Rodden, 2002). Then, it becomes important to find an alternative 
for local governments to improve their economic performance particularly on how 
they finance their infrastructure. In many countries, Mochida (2008) argued that 
local borrowing is an important source for long term development project.
Local bond policy in Indonesia has not been implemented easily; even when the 
regulation already allows the local government to issue bonds. There are still many 
things to be prepared by the central government before local bonds are issued. Some 
issues need to be well prepared, ranging from local governments’ capacity to the 
rules of mechanism. The following are the factors which hamper local government 
in issuing LGBs: 1) a local government must obtain the local parliament’s approval for 
issuing each LGB; 2) a local government must gain audit rating ‘WTP’ or satisfactory 
and 3) macroeconomic stability. In this case, MOF concerns whether both central 
and local governments are ready to have guarantee mechanism if risks like default 
or bankruptcy happen (Qorib, 2014). 
In order to find the appropriate model, learning from other countries experience 
could be beneficial. Turning the attention to Japan, this country has the experience in 
using local bond as an instrument to tackle their local financial problems. Japanese 
local debt is also remarkably high. For comparison, in FY 2005, general government 
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outstanding debt amounted to about JPY 760 Trillion and about JPY 170 trillion was 
local government debts (New York Times, 2007, in Mochida, 2008). Even though 
Japan’s journey in performing local bond has not always been successful, they have 
run continuous policy improvement. Japan’s local bond system has now gradually 
shifted from the traditional model (strict administrative control) towards fiscal rule 
and market discipline (Mochida, 2008). Thus, it is important to learn the experiences 
as well as the policies on how Japan manages this, and making comparison with 
Indonesia’s case. This study would identify the differences between the two countries 
as well as the key factors which might lead to policy success (or failure) on local debt. 
The comparison is also expected to bring some recommendations for the possibility 
of policy adoption by looking at the compared main aspects in the analysis.   
This paper will be divided into five sections. First, the introduction discusses 
briefly about the condition of decentralisation particularly on fiscal issues between 
Indonesia and Japan. The second section is the objectives of this paper. The third 
section contains literature review which mainly discuss about the local government 
bond and the global system of local finance in Japan. The fourth section compares 
local bond management between Indonesia and Japan by focusing on several 
aspects like involved institutions in central level; the rules – mechanism; buyers and 
purposes. The last section will provide conclusion and recommendation. 
1.2 Objectives 
The following are the objectives of this paper:
• Learning about Japan’s local finance system particularly local government 
bond management 
• Conducting comparison of local government bond (LGB) policy between 
Japan and Indonesia by focusing on several aspects, which are: institutions, 
rule of game, buyers and purpose
• Proposing recommendations for policy adoption and/or policy adjustment
II. Literature Review
2.1 Local Government Bond (LGB) 
By definition, local government bond could ‘represent a promise by state or local 
government units (called the issuers) or other qualified issuers to repay to lenders 
(investors) an amount of money borrowed, called principal, along with interest 
according to a fixed schedule’ (O’Hara, 2012, p.1). In Japan, local government bond 
(LGB) has taken significant role in filling the gap between local fiscal capacity and 
its development needs. Apart from covering expenditures, LGB also constitute the 
debt of local government and it is separated from central government debt (MOF, 
2014). As an instrument to fill the gap, the areas in which Japan LGB could finance 
are also limited for: 1) expenditure of public enterprises (traffic, gas, water provision, 
etc.); 2) investment, loans; 3) re-finance of local bonds; 4) disaster restoration and 5) 
public works (MIC, 2007). These areas are strictly stipulated in Article 5 of the Local 
Public Finance Law. 
Japan has three different kinds of LGB: 1) individual LGB, which means every 
local government (prefecture or municipality) may issue bond to the public. Terms 
and conditions for this LGB are mainly based on the negotiation with syndicated 
underwriters and bidding process; 2) Joint-LGB, which means more than one local 
government units sell a certain bond together. Since FY2003, local governments 
in Japan started offering Joint-LGBs in order to minimize costs and achieve stable 
financing; and 3) LGB for resident, or called as citizen participatory-type public 
offering LGB. This instrument aims not only to increase the variation of financing 
methods for individual investors, but also to urge citizens’ participation in local 
government finance (MIC, 2007).
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In order to prevent the unwanted impact of LGBs issuance, some safeguarding 
policies must be provided. According to Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997), there are 
at least four main instruments related to local borrowing which should be opted 
by the government as an LGB’s operating mechanism. The first is high reliance on 
capital market. In this case, government has fewer roles in managing LGB and let 
the market takes major part. The second is enforcing strict administrative controls. 
Local government has to obtain an approval from central before issuing LGB.  The 
third is setting the fiscal rules. The central government might define absolute level 
of several things like debt service ratio, debt repayment, tax collection ratio and/or 
net revenue. The fourth is applying cooperative approach or negotiation. However, 
in the last few years, Japan was in a transition period where implicit government 
guarantee and strict administrative control have been being phased out in favour 
of fiscal rules and market discipline (MIC, 2007). During this period, Mochida (2008) 
argued that a set of actions in performing Japan LGB reform has been developed 
in recent years for local government advancement in terms of autonomy and self-
responsibility.
Applying similar standing rules of defining limit and/or ratio in LGBs (like Japan) 
have also been carried out in other countries. Austria and Spain set limits on the 
absolute level. Germany also arranges the limits of LGB for investment purpose. 
Yet other countries like Brazil and Korea have applied the same rules like Japan by 
setting the limit of local debt to their debt service on the revenues (Ter-Minassian 
and Craig, 1997; Singh and Plekhanov, 2005, in Mochida, 2008, p.137). 
2.2 The Global System of Local Finance in Japan
During post-war period, local financial system in Japan was significantly changed 
from highly centralised to more decentralised way. This alteration was initiated 
by Professor Carl Shoup and was aimed to reduce the dominance of the central 
government. Because of having more delegated functions, Shoup recommended 
that local governments should also have other important substances such as 
increasing tax revenues, applying conditional grants, clear distribution of functions 
and using equalisation grant (Mochida, 2008). However, in practice, local government 
finance until now is still closely related with the central government. Not only that 
local government still tend to rely on central transfers, the central government also 
constructs Local Fiscal Plan annually alongside the national budget (Park, 2011). 
Moreover, according to Japan’s Local Finance Law, local government finance should 
be financially independent, while in reality, the central government takes a major 
role in controlling local budgets (Ishii and Wada, 2015). 
Due to the larger responsibilities, local governments in Japan have been 
equipped with several revenue channels. There are two types of revenue resources: 
ordinary/common and special revenues. The ordinary revenues include local tax 
revenues (Chihozei), unconditional tax grants from the central government (Chiho-
Kofuzei), and local shared taxes (Joyo zei). Besides that, special revenues consist of 
conditional tax grants from the central government (Kokko-Shisyutsu-kin), profits 
from public sector enterprises, and local government bonds (Ishii and Wada, 2015). 
Following is the local government revenues breakdown in fiscal year 2012:
According to chart 1, the revenue pattern in both prefecture and municipality 
is quite similar. Their revenues are dominantly derived from local taxes, followed 
by other revenue resources, such as local allocation taxes (LAT), national treasury 
disbursement, local government bonds and others. To define such figures, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is mainly responsible to 
estimate the projected revenues and projected expenditures together with the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). Both ministries negotiate and decide what instruments 
should be selected to fill the gaps (MIC, 2007). Following are the instruments: 1) simply 
transfer funds from the central in form of various subsidies; 2) local allocation taxes 
(LAT) which are collected nationally but then redistributed to local governments; 
and 3) if both instruments are insufficient, MOF and MIC must renegotiate and find 
other means to fill the gap (Park, 2011). One of the means which may be opted is 
local government bond.
III. Comparing Japan and Indonesia: Local Government Bond (LGB) 
Management
 In developing countries, local government bond (LGB) market is highly 
considered as a competitive alternative besides bank loan (Liu, 2009). Linking with 
the principle of local autonomy, the aim of increasing local financial independence 
through local bond issuance seems important. However, it might create significant 
problems in terms of concept and operational issues, particularly for third world 
countries with high level of corruption and inequality (Rodden, 2002).
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Chart 1. Local Government Revenue Breakdown
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. White Paper on Local Public Finance, 2014
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Therefore, learning good experiences by different countries is worthwhile in 
identifying the possible problems and may even finding solution and possibilities 
of policy adoption. In this section, comparison between two countries in LGB 
management will be analysed into four aspects: involved institutions in the central 
level, rule of game or mechanism, buyers and purposes.
3.1 Main Institutions in Central Level
There are many actors in local government bond market in which each has 
distinct roles. There are central government (certain ministries), local government, 
public finance investment bankers, underwriters, salespeople, trader, analysts, 
lawyers, financial analysts, rating agencies, insurers, commercial bankers, investors, 
brokers, technology developers and vendors, the media, and regulators (O’Hara, 2012). 
However, in practice, following are the main actors related to the implementation of 
local government bond both in Japan and Indonesia:
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The figure below shows the detail mechanism of LGB issuance in Japan.
In general, the procedures of LGB issuance in Indonesia must follow several 
steps (PMK No. 111/2012):
• Defining activities and/or project which will be funded from LGB
• Preparing the feasibility study
• Obtaining the consent of Local Parliament (DPRD)
• Submit all the documents required as mentioned above to the MOF. 
Afterwards, LGB should be reviewed by OJK
• Preparing the Local Regulation (called Perda)
• If the LGB is approved by MOF and OJK, public offering can be initially 
started in capital market 
3.2 Rule of the Game
LGB system in Japan has altered gradually from strict administrative control 
towards market discipline combined with fiscal rule (Mochida, 2008). Before FY 
2006, local government must have approval from MIC for every LGB issuance. This 
approval system was then abolished, though in particular conditions some local 
governments still require clearance from central government (MIC, 2007). On the 
other hand, even though there has been no real implementation yet in Indonesia, 
the central government has stipulated the mechanism of LGB issuance in GR No. 
30/2011 on Local Borrowing. Different with Japan, Indonesia combines the LGB 
system between strict administrative control and fiscal rules (GR No. 30/2011).
Figure 1. LGB Issuance Process in Japan
Source: MOF- Japan, 2014
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3.3 Buyers or Funding Sources
Based on the budget figure in FY 2014 (see Figure 2 below), LGBs in Japan are 
mainly funded by private funds derived from public offerings and private placement 
funds, then followed by public funds. This trend of creditor’s contribution has been 
predicted to change from public funds to private funds (Mochida, 2008).
2  The Fiscal Loan Funds are included in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) provided by the central government as 
a funding source of LGB.  The Japan Finance Organization for Municipalities Funds is funded by investment from all regions to 
assist local governments in financing long term and low-interest rate of LGBs
3   Public offering here means that local governments will purchase their bonds through markets. In addition, private placement 
funds are LGBs which are purchased by financial institutions and some business associations. 
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3.4 Purposes
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 
4.1 Conclusion
 The comparison between Indonesia and Japan revealed a number of 
important points in understanding the current situations of the two countries, 
their strengths and weaknesses, and the challenges they face. After reviewing the 
main aspects which have been compared in both countries (actors, rule of game, 
purposes and buyers), policy adoption might not be simple for Indonesia’s case. We 
can see some of the conditions is quite different, and significantly so, particularly 
in the rule of the game. The absent of safeguarding mechanism from the central 
Government, and the lack obligation to qualify for WTP seem to be a factor that 
hinders LGB proposal for local governments. Considering the lack of reference 
in this particular issue, so further research to look more into the matter is highly 
needed.
 To summarise, the following are the main aspects in this paper which need 
to be considered before applying the full implementation of LGB in Indonesia: 
• Main actors: applying separated functions between issuer, operator and 
checker in respective local government
Figure 2.
Source: MOF- Japan, 2014
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• Rule of game: Safeguard policy seems important to be applied. It 
considers that not all local governments have back up plan if unwanted things in 
LGB’s management happen (such as default)
• Purpose: Indonesia needs to be more focus on the LGB’s purposes itself. 
• Buyers: LGBs can be purchased by everyone but it seems crucial to have 
the arrangement of portfolio investment 
4.2 Recommendation
If Indonesia wants to adopt several concepts or mechanism in Japan’s LGB, 
there are some key factors that Indonesia needs to consider (Liu, 2009):
1. Macroeconomic stability. Issuing LGBs is not only an intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship between central and local but it also engages other parties such 
as creditors. Therefore, assuring overall economic stability is crucial to attract 
the buyers and maintaining their trust level.  
2. Ex-Ante Regulatory Frameworks. There are several suggestions which might 
be useful to be considered as a pre-implementation of LGBs:
• Central government needs to provide effective fiscal rules (setting the 
limits and/or ratios). Due to high reliance of local finance on central 
transfer, applying strict fiscal rules before issuing bonds seems reasonable 
in preventing the potential of negative impacts of LGBs.     
• Enforcing the local government’s transparency such as involving 
independent audit, periodic public disclosure of key fiscal data, and 
others. 
• The purposes of issuing LGBs should be also clearly define to ensure that 
local government would spend bond wisely and effectively
• Revising the condition related to the collateral aspect in the existing 
regulation. In this case, if the projects/assets funded by LGBs are 
inadequate to be categorised as collateral, central should rethinking 
about another formula to ensure that local government is able to provide 
sufficient reserve funds.
3. Ex-Post Insolvency System. The vertical imbalance as well as high reliance 
on central transfer among local government in Indonesia is still high. Central 
government should at least think about the safeguard policy for LGBs 
management
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